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I.

INTRODUCTION

On January 30, 2002, Mark Sanford received a commission as a first lieutenant
in the United States Air Force Reserve's 315th Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron.'
Lieutenant Sanford probably did not envision the political and constitutional
consequences that would result from his new role as a forty-one-year-old junior
officer. Sanford, a Republican gubernatorial candidate when he accepted the
commission, was the focus of immediate criticism questioning the motives behind
his seeking military service.' Sanford was able to overcome the criticism, however,
winning his party's nomination from a crowded Republican field.3 Sanford then
went on to defeat incumbent Democratic Governor Jim Hodges.' On January 15,
2003, just shy of his one-year anniversary in the Air Force Reserve, Sanford
became the 115th Governor of South Carolina.5 At that moment, Sanford began
serving as both an officer in the United States Air Force Reserve and as Governor
of South Carolina.

Sanford's dual positions soon attracted the attention of retired Greenville
businessman, Edward Sloan Jr., a contributor to Sanford's campaign.6 Viewing
himself as a government watchdog, Sloan brought suit before the South Carolina
Supreme Court seeking a declaratory judgment that Sanford could not serve
simultaneously as Governor and as an Air Force Reservist.7
Two important issues were decided in Sloan v. Sanford: first, whether South
Carolina's constitution allows its governor to serve in the Air Force Reserve; and
second, whether Sloan had standing to bring the suit Although the first issue was
the one that caught headlines across the state, it is the standing issue that is more
important to South Carolina jurisprudence. An analysis of the supreme court's
1. Schuyler Kropf, FormerCongressmanSanfordJoinsReserves, POST & COURIER (Charleston,
S.C.), Mar. 8, 2002, at lB.
2. See, e.g., Schuyler Kropf, DemocratsSlam Sanfordfor JoiningReserve DuringCampaignfor
Governor,POST & COURIER (Charleston, S.C.), Mar. 9, 2002, at 1B (reporting State Democratic Party
Chairman Dick Harpootlian's characterization that Sanford's acceptance of a reserve commission was
an effort to "sneak[] into the uniform of his country to inoculate himself from criticism that he is antimilitary"; Harpootlian also criticized Sanford's congressional voting record as weak on defense.).
3. See Dan Hoover, Sanford Coasts to Win, GREENVILLE NEWS (S.C.), June 26, 2002, at IA.
4. See Dan Hoover, Sanford Defeats Hodges; Graham Going to Senate, GREENVILLE NEWS

(S.C.), Nov. 6, 2002, at IA.
5. Office of the Governor, State of South Carolina, Mark Sanford Biography, available at
http'/www.scgovemor.cominterior.asp?SiteContentld=3&Navld=51&Parentld=O (last visited Mar.

4, 2005).
6. Rick Brundrett, Suit Challenges Sanford in Reserve, THE STATE (Columbia, S.C.), Nov. 20,
2003, at BI.

7. Sloan v. Sanford, 357 S.C. 431, 433, 593 S.E.2d 470, 471-72 (2004).
8. Id. at 433, 593 S.E.2d at 472.
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reasoning in Sanford reveals that South Carolina's standing jurisprudence sits in
stark contrast to that of the federal system.9 The federal standing model sets a high
bar for those citizens bringing suits challenging governmental action. The South
Carolina model is less prohibitive, allowing courts to adjudicate more suits on the
merits.'" Though South Carolina's standing issues are not completely resolved in
all respects, particularly the precise definition of "standing" and whether
constitutional standing exists, the state's approach is, on the whole, appropriate for
South Carolina."
Part II of this Note analyzes the two issues addressed in Sanford: the
constitutionality of dual-office holding and taxpayer standing. Part III is a detailed
exposition of the South Carolina standing model in comparison to the federal
model. Part IV analyzes the court's reasoning in Sanford in light of South
Carolina's standing model. Part V explores possible reasons for the differences in
the federal and South Carolina standing requirements and explains why South
Carolina's system is better suited for this state.
II.

SLOAN V. SANFORD

A.

ConstitutionalityofDual-Office Holding

The Sanfordcourt devoted most of its attention to the same issue that the media
perceived as most important: whether Sanford could simultaneously hold a
The
commission in the Air Force Reserve and serve as Governor.'
constitutionality of a Governor serving in the Reserve of a branch of the United
States military was one of first impression in South Carolina. Sloan's challenge to
Sanford's service focused on article IV, section 2 of the South Carolina
Constitution, which provides, "No person while Governor shall hold any office or
other Commission (except in the militia) under the authority of this State, or of any
other power."' 3 The court chronicled the historical meaning of "militia," from the
time of King Alfred the Great through South Carolina's Antebellum era and
continuing up to the present day. 4 The court determined that, despite the federal
control over the Air Force Reserve, it falls within the definition of militia because
the Reserve consists of citizen soldiers.' Some may argue, however, the term
militia applies only to the National Guard because the state controls the Guard with
the Governor as commander-in-chief. Nevertheless, the court held Sanford's
service was not a separation of powers violation because Sanford was "not serving
in two of the three branches of government by holding a commission in the Air

9. See infra Part I.
10. See infra Part li.
11. See infra Part1i.
12. Sanford, 357 S.C. at 431, 593 S.E.2d at 470.
13. Id. at 435, 593 S.E.2d at 472 (citing S.C. CONsT. art. IV,
14. Id. at 435-36, 593 S.E.2d at 472-73.
15. Id. at431, 593 S.E.2d at 473.
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Force Reserve.""' The court cited eight cases from otherjurisdictions, asserting that
these decisions from other states supported the ability of state officers to serve in
the Reserves. 7 The court concluded that the Governor's Reserve service does not
compromise his allegiance to the state and that the policies of both South Carolina
and the federal government support military service.
B. Taxpayer Standing
Despite the importance of the dual-office holding issue, resolution of the
standing issue is more likely to have a greater impact on South Carolina's legal
structure. Standing cases are much more common than those questioning the
proper role of constitutional officers, particularly cases challenging the ability of
an officer to hold dual offices. In a mere four paragraphs, the court held Sloan had
standing to bring suit." The brief treatment the court gave this issue belies its
importance. The court justified Sloan's standing based on its holding in Bairdv.
CharlestonCounty.'9 In Baird,the court held that the issuance of tax-exempt bonds
to the Medical University of South Carolina "impact[ed] a profound public
interest-the public health and welfare."' ° The Sanford court analogized this case
to Baird when it held the ability of South Carolina's Governor to hold his office
was atleast as important as the issuance of tax-exempt bonds."
The court dealt with the standing issue in Sanford so quickly because its
jurisprudence is quite developed in this area. The following discussion provides a
detailed look at South Carolina's standing jurisprudence and demonstrates the
similarities and differences between the state's model and the federal model.
Ill. SOUTH CAROLINA VERSUS FEDERAL STANDING

A.

ConstitutionalVersus Prudential
1. FederalModel

The relevance of the terms constitutional and prudential have no import in
South Carolina's standing jurisprudence absent an understanding of their definition
and importance to the federal system. Thus, a historical review of the terms as they
relate to federal jurisprudence is important.
Simply stated, standing in the federal model is "whether the litigant is entitled
to have the court decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues."' This
entitlement is limited by certain requirements, which the court has recognized as

16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

Sloan v. Sanford, 357 S.C. 431,437, 593 S.E.2d 470, 473 (2004).
Id. at 437 n.4, 593 S.E.2d at 473-74 n.4.
Id. at 433-34, 593 S.E.2d at 472.
333 S.C. 519, 511 S.E.2d 69 (1999).
Id. at 531, 511 S.E.2d at 75.
Sanford, 357 S.C. at 434, 593 S.E.2d at 472.
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975).
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constitutional and prudential.' The constitutional requirement arises out of the
interpretation of "case or controversy" in Article M1.' The prudential requirement
arises when "countervailing considerations may outweigh the concerns underlying
the usual reluctance to exert judicial power when the plaintiff's claim to relief rests
on the legal rights of third parties."25 Whereas constitutional requirements of
standing must always be met, Congress may override prudential requirements.26
a.

ConstitutionalRequirements

The United States Supreme Court held the Constitution limits federal courts to
hear cases and controversies as set forth in Article I of the Constitution.2 7 The
case or controversy limitation is based on the requirement of a limited federal
judicial power and the constitutional mandate of coequality of the Executive,
Legislative, and Judicial branches of the federal government.2"
In developing its standing jurisprudence, the Court utilized practical terms to
ease application of the constitutional case or controversy requirement. The Court
enumerated three broad categories of constitutional standing requirements:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an "injury in fact"-an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized,... and (b) "actual or imminent, not 'conjectural'
or 'hypothetical"'.... Second, there must be a causal connection
between the injury and the conduct complained of-the injury has
to be "fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the

defendant, and not... th[e] result [of] the independent action of
some third party not before the court." Third, it must be "likely,"
as opposed to merely "speculative," that the injury will be
"redressed by a favorable decision."29
Thus, a cause of action in federal court must allege the defendant caused an injury
for which the court can provide the plaintiff a remedy. If any of these requirements
is missing, the plaintiff will not be entitled to have the court hear the merits of the
claim.3 The constitutional requirements, however, are only part of the standard
that a litigant must satisfy for standing.

23. Id.
24. Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. Ifi).
25. Id. at 500-01.
26. See Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997).
27. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984).
28. See id.
29. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (alteration in original) (citations
omitted).
30. Id. at 561 (discussing the "indispensable" nature of the standing elements to a plaintiff's case).
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b. PrudentialRequirements
Two additional standing requirements are independent of the constitutional
requirements set forth above. These prudential requirements are subject to
congressional abrogation." The first requirement, known as the prohibition against
third party standing, is that a party is capable of asserting only his own rights and
is unable to bring the claims of third parties before a federal court.3 2 The second
requirement is that status as a taxpayer does not confer the ability to raise, before
a federal court, grievances shared with all other taxpayers.3 3 But a narrow
exception34 to the prohibition against generalized grievances exists-taxpayer
standing.
The Court held that even if a party alleges a sufficient injury to meet the
constitutional requirements, the party still may not have met the requirement for
standing.3' This occurs when the injury alleged is not personal to the party, but is3
36
instead sustained by third parties. In this scenario, the claim lacks standing.
Exceptions exist to the prohibition against third party standing. 38 Though third
party standing is an important concept and an issue often before the Court, taxpayer
standing and the ban on generalized grievances are more relevant to the comparison
between the federal and South Carolina models.
2. South CarolinaModel
Until 2001, no South Carolina case discussed constitutional or prudential
standing. In Sea Pines Ass'n for the Protection of Wildlife v. South Carolina
Departmentof NaturalResources, the South Carolina Supreme Court adopted the
Lujan test and quoted the United States Supreme Court's characterization of the test
as the "irreducible constitutional minimum of standing."39 The court applied the
Lujan test to similar issues in Sea Pinesand denied standing.' The court of appeals
later adopted the same test in Sloan v. Greenville County." In that case, however,

31. Bennett, 520 U.S. at 162.
32. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,499 (1975).

33. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 217 (1974) (stating that
the Court does not allow "generalized grievances' about the conduct of Government as a basis for
taxpayer standing").
34. See ERWlN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUiONAL LAW § 2.5.5, at 89-94 (2d ed. 2002) (explaining
the history of taxpayer standing).
35. See Warth, 422 U.S. at 499.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. These exceptions usually center on a close relationship between the parties when the third
parties cannot assert their own rights, in addition to cases or controversies involving First Amendment
issues. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 34, § 2.5.4, at 82-89.
39. 345 S.C. 594,601,550 S.E.2d 287, 291 (2001) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504
U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
40. Id. at 600-03, 550 S.E.2d at 291-92.
41. Sloan v. Greenville County, 356 S.C. 531, 590 S.E.2d 338 (Ct. App. 2003).
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the court of appeals flatly stated, "A party seeking to establish standing must prove
the 'irreducible constitutional minimum of standing ......
Currently, constitutional standing issues in South Carolina present many more
questions than answers. The South Carolina Supreme Court in Sea Pines may have
adopted the Lujan test intending the test to serve only as an extension of its
standing jurisprudence and not as a constitutional requirement. The language of the
court of appeals in Sloan v. Greenville County is even more perplexing. An
unresolved issue after this case, then, is whether the court intended a fundamental
change to South Carolina's standing jurisprudence to incorporate constitutional
requirements. Furthermore, whether these constitutional requirements are a part of
the United States Constitution or a part of the South Carolina Constitution is
unclear. Another unresolved issue is whether Sea Pines' constitutional language
applies only to environmental concerns. The court of appeals apparently did not
think the language applied to environmental concerns in Sloan v. Greenville
County.
Irrespective of Sea Pines and Sloan v. Greenville County, questions remain as
to whether the legislature can abrogate any of the standing requirements set forth
by the South Carolina Supreme Court. If the requirements are constitutional, the
legislature would not have the right to abrogate them. The murkiness cast upon the
issue by Sea Pines and especially Sloan v. Greenville County leaves open for
speculation how a South Carolina court would decide whether its standing
requirements are constitutionally required. The primary distinction between the
federal and South Carolina standing models is the definition and use of the terms
constitutional and prudential.
B. The Definition of Standing in South Carolina Cases: A Real Party in
Interest
For a claim to be heard by a South Carolina court, "a justiciable controversy
must be present."43 The court defined a justiciable controversy as one that is "real
and substantial," instead of hypothetical or abstract." The term justiciability
incorporates "the doctrines of ripeness, mootness, and standing,"45 all of which are
terms shared in common with the federal system.
In addition to the justiciability requirement, the court set forth a test it refers to
as "a real party in interest." The court defined "[a] real party in interest [as] one
who has a real, material, or substantial interest in the subject matter of the action,
'
as opposed to one who has only a nominal or technical interest in the action."47
The

42. Id. at 549, 590 S.E.2d at 348.
43. Id. at 546, 590 S.E.2d at 346.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 547, 590 S.E.2d at 346.
46. Id. at 547, 590 S.E.2d at 347 (quoting Charleston County Sch. Dist. v. Charleston County
Election Comm'n, 336 S.C. 174, 181, 519 S.E.2d 567, 571 (1999)).
47. Sloan v. Greenville County, 356 S.C. 531,547, 590 S.E.2d 338, 347 (Ct. App. 2003) (quoting
Charleston County Sch. Dist., 336 S.C. at 181, 519 S.E.2d at 571).
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real party in interest language and its subsequent definitions are derived from the
South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure.4"
As a primary matter, standing as defined in South Carolina is different from its
definition in federal courts. As enumerated above, federal standing requires a party
to allege an injury caused by the defendant for which the court can provide the
plaintiff with a remedy.49 South Carolina's definition has no such requirement.
To have standing in South Carolina, the plaintiff must have a "real, material or
substantial interest" in the lawsuit's subject.5 0 Unlike the federal model, South
Carolina requires no injury, causation, or redressability. Thus, from the beginning,
a plaintiff in a South Carolina court has a lower hurdle for adjudication of his or her
claim.
Distinguishing between a "real, material, or substantial interest" and one that
is merely "nominal or technical" is problematic."' South Carolina courts have not
defined the terms nor the differences between them. The "real party in interest"
language is drawn from the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 17(a). 2
The rule provides that "[e)very action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real
party in interest." 3 Analyzing Rule 17(a), the South Carolina Court of Appeals
held in Town ofSullivan's Islandv. Felgeras follows:
SCRCP 17(a) provides that in order to have standing to sue, a
plaintiff must be a real party in interest. "A real party in interest
is one who has a real, material, or substantial interest in the
subject matter of the litigation, as opposed to one who has only a
nominal or technical interest in the action."'
Seven reported cases in South Carolina have reflected similar reasoning,
though onlyFelgermakes reference to Rule 17(a) itself.-" The only guidance South
Carolina courts have given is the manner in which the courts citing that language
have granted standing. Sea Pines is the only case to use the "real, material or
substantial" language and deny standing. This case is important not only for its

48. See S.C. R. Civ. P. 17(a).
49. See supra Part III.A. l.a.
50. GreenvilleCounty, 356 S.C. at 547, 590 S.E.2d at 347 (quoting CharlestonCounty Sch. Dist.,
336 S.C. at 181, 519 S.E.2d at 571).
51. Id.
52. S.C. R. Civ. P. 17(a).
53. Id. (the South Carolina rule largely mirrors the federal rule's language).
54. 318 S.C. 340, 346, 457 S.E.2d 626, 629 (Ct. App. 1995) (quoting Anchors Point, Inc., v.
Shoals Sewer Co., 308 S.C. 422,418 S.E.2d 546 (1992)).
55. See Sea Pines Ass'n for the Protection of Wildlife v. S.C. Dep't ofNatural Res., 345 S.C. 594,
600, 550 S.E.2d 287, 291 (2001); Henry v. Horry County, 334 S.C. 461,463, 514 S.E.2d 122, 123 n.1
(1999); Charleston County Sch. Dist., 336 S.C. at 181, 519 S.E.2d at 571; Anchor Points,Inc. at 428,
418 S.E.2d at 549; All Saints Parish, Waccamaw v. Protestant Episcopal Church, 358 S.C. 209, 220,
595 S.E.2d 253, 260 (Ct. App. 2004); Greenville County, 342 S.C. at 547, 590 S.E.2d at 347; Felger,
318 S.C. at 346, 457 S.E.2d at 629.
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denial of standing, but also because it uses the constitutional language discussed
above.
In Sea Pines, the court adopted the standing test discussed in Lujan"6 Sea
Pines involved wildlife organizations' attempt to stop the Department of Natural
Resources from issuing permits to hunt deer in a wildlife sanctuary. 7 The court
ultimately held that like the plaintiffs in Lujan, the wildlife organizations did not
have standing to bring suit because they failed Lujan's three-part test.58
The South Carolina Supreme Court may not have adopted Lujan to determine
standing in any suit. Since Sea Pines, the supreme court has not applied the Lujan
test in any case involving standing. The court of appeals, however, viewed the
supreme court's adoption of Lujan as extending beyond the environmental realm.
The court of appeals applied Lujan in a case involving a conservation advocacy
group's attempt to block decisions of a zoning board 9 and a case in which a
taxpayer sued over annexation of property by a city.6 Whether the supreme court
will extend Sea Pines to cases not involving an environmental concern is unclear.
The court in Sea Pines only mentioned the "real, material or substantial"
language as an initial matter. The court failed to address whether the plaintiffs
interest was "real, material or substantial." The fact that the court denied standing
indicates that it must have concluded that the plaintiff's interest was not "real,
material or substantial." Attempting to glean a definition of "real, material, or
substantial" as opposed to "nominal or technical" in South Carolina's courts may
be impossible. The particularized facts of the cases using the language seem to
show only that when the language is used, standing is likely to be granted.6' Sea
Pines remains the only exception. 2 Thus, the interest of environmental groups
seeking to prevent governmental action when they cannot establish a direct link
between themselves and the injunction sought may fall within the nominal or
technical exception.63

56. Sea Pines, 345 S.C. at 601, 550 S.E.2d at 291.

57. Id. at 597-98, 550 S.E.2d at 289-90.
58. Id. at 603, 550 S.E.2d at 292.
59. Beaufort Realty Co., v. Beaufort County, 346 S.C. 298, 551 S.E.2d 588 (Ct. App. 2001).
60. Beaufort County v. Trask, 349 S.C. 522, 563 S.E.2d 660 (Ct. App. 2002).
61. See Henry v. Horry County, 334 S.C. 461, 463, 514 S.E.2d 122, 123 n.1 (1999); Charleston
County Sch. Dist. v. Charleston County Election Comm'n, 336 S.C. 174, 181, 519 S.E.2d 567, 571
(1999); Anchor Points, Inc. v. Shoals Sewer Co., 308 S.C. 422, 428, 418 S.E.2d 546, 549 (1992); All
Saints Parish, Waccamaw v. Protestant Episcopal Church, 358 S.C. 209, 220, 595 S.E.2d 253, 260 (Ct.
App. 2004); Sloan v. Greenville County, 342 S.C. 531,547, 590 S.E.2d 338, 347 (Ct. App. 2003); Town
of Sullivan's Island v. Felger, 318 S.C. 340, 346, 457 S.E.2d 626, 629 (Ct. App. 1995).
62. Sea Pines Ass'n for the Protection of Wildlife v. S.C. Dep't of Natural Res., 345 S.C. 594,
600, 550 S.E.2d 287, 291 (2001).
63. Id. at 600-03, 550 S.E.2d at 291-92.
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C. Generalized Grievances Versus Taxpayer Standing

1. FederalModel
The terms "generalized grievance" and "taxpayer standing" are important
aspects of both the federal and South Carolina standing models. Because of the
multi-faceted nature of the terms and the parallels between the federal and South
Carolina models' use of them, a rather detailed synopsis of the terms' significance
in the federal model precedes the discussion of the terms' meaning and use in the
South Carolina model.
The difference between a "generalized grievance" and "taxpayer standing" in
the federal standing model is a narrow one. A generalized grievance is a harm that

is relatively equally spread and shared in common by a large group or all citizens."
The term taxpayer standing seems to be used as a substitute for, or in conjunction
with, the term generalized grievance when the Taxing and Spending Clause of
Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution is invoked.6" The terms are distinct, though,
because taxpayer standing seems to be an exception to the prohibition against
generalized grievances." In Flast v. Cohen, the United States Supreme Court set

forth a two-part test to determine whether a taxpayer's claim merits standing.67 The
Flast test requires that a plaintiff who seeks standing as a taxpayer to establish a
nexus between one's status as a taxpayer and the nature of the challenged
legislation and a nexus between that plaintiff's status as a taxpayer "and the precise
nature of the constitutional infringement alleged."6 The test further requires a

64. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490,499 (1975).
65. See Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 618 (1988); United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166
(1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974); Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83 (1968).
66. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 34, § 2.5.5, at 94 (discussing the Court's narrow exception
allowing taxpayer standing claims challenging governmental expenditures that allegedly violate the
Establishment Clause); see also Bowen, 487 U.S. at 619 ("[W]e have not questioned the standing of
taxpayer plaintiffs to raise Establishment Clause challenges . .
67. The test provides the following:
First, the taxpayer must establish a logical link between that status and the type
of legislative enactment attacked. Thus, a taxpayer will be a proper party to allege
the unconstitutionality only of exercises of congressional power under the taxing
and spending clause of Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution. It will not be sufficient to
allege an incidental expenditure of tax funds in the administration of an essentially
regulatory statute .... Secondly, the taxpayer must establish a nexus between
that status and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged.
Under this requirement, the taxpayer must show that the challenged enactment
exceeds specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the exercise of the
congressional taxing and spending power and not simply that the enactment is
generally beyond the power delegated to Congress by Art. I, § 8. When both
nexuses are established, the litigant will have shown a taxpayer's stake in the
outcome of the controversy and will be a proper and appropriate party to invoke
a federal court's jurisdiction.
Flast,392 U.S. at 102-03.
68. Id. at 102.
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The Flast test's net effect has been to limit standing in taxpayer claims to the
Establishment Clause."° Though Flastis still good law, it has not been extended. 71
not recognized taxpayer claims
Even under the Establishment Clause, the Court has
72
unless they challenge expenditures specifically.
Thus, the Court has "limited taxpayer standing to challenges directed 'only [at]
exercises of congressional power"'7 a and prohibited cases in which the alleged
wrong was not executed under the Taxing and Spending Clause of Article 1,
Section 8, but rather "under the Property Clause, Art. IV, §3, cl. 2."' Additionally,
the Court has required a direct challenge of congressional action, refusing to grant
standing if Congress channels its authority through a regulatory agency.75 This
requirement is incongruous, given Congress's authority not only to vest power in
regulatory agencies, but also to overturn regulatory action or decisions.
In Lujan, the Court further limited taxpayer standing by indicating that the
prohibition against generalized grievances and perhaps taxpayer standing were, in
fact, constitutional bars to citizen suit. 76 Prior to deciding Lujan, the Court adhered
to its holding in Warth that the prohibition against generalized grievances was a
prudential requirement.7 7 Not surprisingly, Lujan's holding left undisturbed the
principle, as set forth above, that a court will not grant taxpayer standing to litigants
who do not sue under the Taxing and Spending Clause.78
The federal taxpayer standing model paints a picture of an increasingly
restrictive standard for plaintiffs seeking relief from the courts. In glaring contrast
to this restrictive model is South Carolina's taxpayer standing model, which is
increasingly more liberal.
2. South CarolinaModel
Much like the federal model, courts in South Carolina hold that a generalized
grievance is insufficient for a court to hear a citizen's claim. Unlike the federal
model, however, South Carolina recognizes an exception known as taxpayer

69. Id.
70. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 34, § 2.5.5, at 94 (discussing the Court's narrow exception
allowing taxpayer standing claims challenging governmental expenditures that allegedly violate the

Establishment Clause).
71. See id. at 92-94.
72. See id. at 93 (explaining that the Court's jurisprudence indicates taxpayer standing is only

allowed if a party "challenges a government expenditure as violating the establishment clause").
73. Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Am. United for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464,
479 (1982) (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 102 (1968)).
74. Id. at 480.
75. Id. at 479.
76. See CHEMERNSKY, supra note 34, § 2.5.5, at 94-95 (explaining the possible constitutional
impact of Lujan).
77. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975).
78. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992) (neglecting to specifically mention the
Taxing and Spending Clause in its opinion denying standing, possibly indicating that the jurisprudential
principle requiring the Taxing and Spending Clause be used to invoke taxpayer standing still exists).

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol56/iss4/5

10

Spencer: Hearing Those WhoCIVIL
Pay the
Bills: A Comparison of the Federal and
PROCEDURE
2005]

standing.79 South Carolina's requirements to grant standing are far less restrictive
than the federal requirements.
Case law reflects South Carolina's less exacting standard. South Carolina
courts use the term "general interest," which appears to be analogous to the term
"generalized grievance." The South Carolina Supreme Court has held that a private
citizen will not have standing to challenge the legality of governmental action
unless he or she has, or likely will sustain, an injury from the governmental action."0
Nonetheless, South Carolina has long recognized taxpayers as a separate class from
normal citizens."'
In Sloan v. School District of Greenville County, yet another case seeking a
declaratory judgment, Edward Sloan Jr., brought suit against the School District of
Greenville County and members of the school board "as a citizen, resident,
taxpayer, and registered elector of Greenville County, and on behalf of all others
similarly situated." 2 Sloan petitioned the court to have "certain contracts entered
into by the District [declared] ultra vires to the District's [power]." 3 The court
held that "[a] taxpayer's standing to challenge unauthorized or illegal governmental
acts has been repeatedly recognized in South Carolina."'" The court concluded that
Sloan had standing to bring the suit over the alleged violation of a statute requiring
that government contracts be awarded on a competitive bidding basis.8" Thus,
South Carolina's standingjurisprudence finds the claims of those taxpayers seeking
to invoke the judicial power meritorious, because of the unique relationship
between capital-contributing taxpayers and their government. Unlike the federal
model, which only allows taxpayers' claims when they originate under the Taxing
and Spending Clause, the South Carolina courts seem to allow any claims that
challenge governmental action." Ultimately, South Carolina courts allow a far
wider range of claims through the courthouse door than their federal counterparts
allow. As the United States Supreme Court has readily admitted, claims exist that
elude adjudication because the Court requires that taxpayer actions be brought
under the Taxing and Spending Clause.87 Because South Carolina courts do not

79. See Mauldin v. City Council of Greenville, 33 S.C. 1, 16, 11 S.E. 434, 435 (1890) (stating

taxpayer standing can be established by a showing that an illegal act will inflict a "special and peculiar"
injury to the complaining taxpayer).
80. Florence Morning News, Inc. v. Bldg. Comm'n of Florence, 265 S.C. 389, 398, 218 S.E.2d
881, 884-85 (1975).
81. See Mauldin, 33 S.C. at 16, 11 S.E. at 435.
82. Sloan v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville County, 342 S.C. 515, 516, 537 S.E.2d 299, 300 (Ct. App.
2000).
83. Id. at 517, 537 S.E.2d at 300.
84. Id. at 520, 537 S.E.2d at 301.
85. Id. at 522, 537 S.E.2d at 303.
86. See supra Part Il.C.1. In each of the following cases challenging governmental action,
standing was granted: Sloan v. Sanford, 357 S.C. 431, 593 S.E.2d 470 (2004) (challenging Governor's
ability to hold dual offices); Sloan v. Greenville County, 356 S.C. 531, 590 S.E.2d 338 (Ct. App. 2003)

(challenging Greenville County's procurement procedures of construction services for three designbuild public works projects); Sloan v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville County, 342 S.C. 515, 537 S.E.2d 299
(Ct.App. 2000) (challenging contracts entered into by the Greenville County School District).
87. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 179 (1974).
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bind themselves to a constitutional requirement for taxpayer standing, they are
much more hospitable to taxpayer claims.
South Carolina's position is admirable because a wide range of governmental
action may be peculiar to a small class of persons, who would not normally have
the ability to elicit legislative action. Under the federal requirements, however, a
discrete minority is barred from remedy because its small number can not arouse
the attention of a large enough group of legislators, and the courts will not
adjudicate its claims based on what most non-legally educated persons would call
a technicality. South Carolina's jurisprudence militates against this fundamental
unfairness. Though South Carolina does not recognize generalized grievances per
se, taxpayer standing is the exception that nearly swallows the rule, allowing a
much broader range of claims into court.
The possibility still exists that a person not paying South Carolina taxes, such
as an out-of-state resident, may not have a remedy in South Carolina courts. That
person may argue, however, that paying South Carolina sales tax would allow
taxpayer standing. This scenario remains speculative because South Carolina
courts have not faced such a question. Taxpayer standing alone serves as a low bar
to citizen suits in this state. Furthermore, South Carolina's unique recognition of
a very significant caveat, public importance, allows the adjudication of even more
citizen suits.
D. PublicImportance
1. Baird v. Charleston County
The words public importance first appeared in a South Carolina case in 1999."8
In Baird, a group of doctors sought an injunction against Charleston County to
prevent it from acting ultra vires in issuing tax-exempt bonds to the University
Medical Associates ofthe Medical University of South Carolina." In its discussion
granting standing to the doctors, the court held that "a court may confer standing
upon a party when an issue is of such public importance as to require its resolution
for future guidance."' ' Though this statement was novel, the court backed up its
holding by citing to precedent in which standing was conferred based upon "wide
concern, both to law enforcement personnel and to the public,.

.

." and when

"questions of public interest originally encompassed in an action should be decided
for future guidance.... ."'
After setting forth this new principle, the court had to determine whether the
doctors' complaint was of public importance. Succinctly, the court held that "the
issuance of the hospital bonds clearly impacts a profound public interest-the

88. Baird v. Charleston County, 333 S.C. 519, 511 S.E.2d 69 (1999).
89. Id. at 524-25, 511 S.E.2d at 72.
90. Id. at 531, 511 S.E.2d at 75.
91. Id. (citing Thompson v. S.C. Comm'n on Alcohol & Drug Abuse, 267 S.C. 463, 229 S.E.2d
718 (1976) (emphasis added); Berry v. Zahler, 220 S.C. 86, 66 S.E.2d 459 (1951)).
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than this one."' The public importance rule set forth in Bairdis not isolated to the
facts of that case. On the contrary, it has been applied in several cases, almost
invariably used to support the existence of standing.93
2.

The Wake of Baird

Baird'sestablishment of public importance standing did not take long to find
its way into other South Carolina courts' opinions. Since Baird, seven reported
cases have employed the public importance language as a means to grant standing.94
Discussion of each of these cases demonstrates how courts have followed and
expanded upon the rule from Baird.
In CarolinaAlliancefor FairEmployment v. South CarolinaDepartment of
Labor, Licensing, & Regulation a former temporary employee and his employer
brought a declaratory judgement action against a temporary employment agency
and the South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation alleging
the temporary employment agency's minimum wage notification did not comply
with certain statutory requirements.9"
Neither of the parties raised the issue of public importance standing; the court
of appeals raised it sua sponte.96 The court of appeals justified raising the issue
because parties cannot consent to conferjurisdiction upon a court when ajusticiable
controversy does not exist.97 In addition, the court of appeals reasoned that the
public importance rule was an exception to the standing requirement, rather than
a type of standing unto itself.98 In support of the public importance rule, the court
of appeals cited Baird and held the increasing use of temporary employees in
today's workforce raised the issue to the level of public importance. 99 The court of
appeals viewed the public importance rule as an exception to South Carolina's
standing doctrine. Whether public importance is an exception or merely another
way of conferring standing seems to be a distinction without a difference, because
the practical result under either theory likely would be the same.

92. Id.
93. See infra Part IlI.D.2.
94. Sloan v. Wilkins, 2005 S.C. LEXIS 28, at *4-5 (Jan. 28, 2005); Sloan v. Sanford, 357 S.C.
431,434, 593 S.E.2d 470, 472 (2004); Charleston County Parents for Pub. Sch. v. Moseley, 343 S.C.
509, 514, 541 S.E.2d 533, 535 (2001); Evins v. Richland County Historic Pres. Comm'n, 341 S.C. 15,
21, 532 S.E.2d 876, 879 (2000); Sloan v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville County, 342 S.C. 515, 522, 537
S.E.2d 299, 303 (Ct. App. 2000); Sloan v. Greenville County, 356 S.C. 531, 548, 590 S.E.2d 338, 347
(Ct. App. 2003); Carolina Alliance for Fair Employment v. S.C. Dep't of Labor, Licensing, &
Regulation, 337 S.C. 476, 488, 523 S.E.2d 795, 801 (Ct. App. 1999).
95. CarolinaAlliance, 337 S.C. at 480-82, 523 S.E.2d at 797-98.
96. Id. at 485, 523 S.E.2d at 800.
97. Id.
98. See id. at 488, 523 S.E.2d at 801.
99. Id. at 488-89, 523 S.E.2d at 801-02.
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The South Carolina Supreme Court revisited Baird'spublic importance rule in
Evins v. Richland County HistoricPreservationCommission."° In Evins, a citizen
brought suit against the Historic Preservation Commission, the county, and the city
over property conveyances." ' The appellant argued that the trial court erred in
granting standing and asked the South Carolina Supreme Court to limit Baird to
ultra vires acts of "immense public importance." ' 2 Despite holding the actions of
the Richland County Historic Preservation Commission were ultra vires, the court
declined to draw the distinction the appellants sought, leaving the rule of Baird
intact, and arguably stronger. 3 The holding in Evins tacitly indicates any
governmental action rising to the level of public importance is subject to judicial
review through a taxpayer suit.
In Sloan v. School Districtof Greenville County, the court of appeals further
justified the public importance jurisprudence.'" The court held, "Public policy
demands a system of checks and balances whereby taxpayers can hold public
officials accountable for their acts ....Taxpayers must have some mechanism of
enforcing the law."'0 5 The court of appeals' reasoning is sound and consistent with
the principle that the electoral process is not entirely sufficient to ensure public
officials will execute their duties faithfully. This is especially true for non-elected
officials who are often insulated from the pressure and the accountability of
elections. Further, by vesting in taxpayers the power to challenge actions of
officials and agencies, the audit power is in the hands of those who are bankrolling
the challenged action.
In Sloan v. Greenville County, the court of appeals indicated in dicta that the
rule of public importance is not carte blanche for "per se... judicial determination
of [an] issue."'" Instead, the court stated, "[T]he party must demonstrate some
overriding public purpose or concern to confer standing to sue on behalf of her
fellow taxpayers.

' °

7

In Sanford, the South Carolina Supreme Court treated the issue of public
importance with a brief analysis.'0 8 The court cited to Baird holding that "[t]he
eligibility of South Carolina's governor to serve in this State's highest elected
office is at least as important as the proper funding for a clinical hospital for
MUSC."' The court exercised a considerable amount of judicial economy by
simply stating what is obvious based on its precedent, rather than indulging in an
unnecessary, in depth analysis.
100. 341 S.C. 15, 532 S.E.2d 876 (2000).
at 18, 532 S.E.2d at 877.
101. See id.
102. Id. at 21, 523 S.E.2d at 879.

103. See id.
104. 342 S.C. 515, 537 S.E.2d 299 (Ct. App. 2000).
105. Id. at 523, 537 S.E.2d at 303 (quoting E. Mo. Laborers Dist. Council v. St. Louis County,
781 S.W.2d 43, 47 (1984)).
106. 356 S.C. 531, 549, 590 S.E.2d 338, 347 (Ct. App. 2003).
107. Id. (citing Beaufort County v. Trask, 349 S.C. 522, 529, 563 S.E.2d 660, 664 (Ct. App.
2002).
108. Sloan v. Sanford, 357 S.C. 431, 593 S.E.2d 470 (2004).
109. Id. at 434, 593 S.E.2d at 472.
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In a relatively short amount of time, the public importance rule of Baird has
become an established rule of law. In Charleston County Parentsfor Public
Schools, Inc. v. Moseley, a parent's group brought a complaint seeking to have the
county auditor impose a higher tax levy." ° In Moseley, "All parties conced[ed]
[p]etitioners [had] standing because the issue [was] one of public importance that
requir[ed] resolution for future guidance.'
The most recent case on the public importance issue is Sloan v. Wilkins."' In
Wilkins, Edward Sloan sued the General Assembly alleging the Life Sciences Act
violated article Im,section 17 of the South Carolina Constitution."' To reach its
decision, the court cited Baird'spublic importance language, as well as Sanford,
and Sloan v. Greenville County." 4 The brief portion of the opinion that focused on
standing consisted of little more than the citation of cases and concluded, "In light
of the great public importance of this matter, we find Sloan has standing to maintain
this action.""' Thus, Wilkins is the most recent example of the established nature
of the public importance exception in South Carolina's standing jurisprudence.
The federal model does not recognize public importance standing as observed
by its low tolerance for taxpayer standing. Though the rest of the terms used in the
South Carolina standing model find some resonance in the federal model, public
importance is a creation of South Carolina courts and represents a novel approach
to allowing adjudication of claims. With public importance, the major distinctions
between the federal and South Carolina standing models end.
IV. STANDING IN SLOAN V. SANFORD

The South Carolina Supreme Court's treatment of the standing issue in Sanford
was rather brief."6 The court apparently viewed Sanford as an easy case based on
its established standing model. Under the federal model, however, a federal court
would have denied standing and probably would have done so with even more
brevity than the South Carolina Supreme Court used to grant standing. The court
based standing primarily on the public importance holding of Baird."'
Although the court granted standing based on public importance, the opinion
begins with the general rule: "[t]o have standing, a litigant must have a personal
stake in the subject matter of the litigation.""" Under the general rule, conceiving
a businessman from Greenville forcing a court's hand to decide whether the

110. Charleston County Parents for Pub. Sch., Inc. v. Moseley, 343 S.C. 509, 511, 541 S.E.2d

533, 534 (2001).
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 514, 541 S.E.2d at 535.
Sloan v. Wilkins, No. 25933, 2005 S.C. LEXIS 28 (S.C. Jan. 28, 2005).
Id. at *2.
Id.at *4.
Id.
See note 108 and accompanying text.
See Sloan v. Sanford, 357 S.C. 431,434, 593 S.E.2d 470, 472 (2004).
Id. (citing Glaze v. Grooms, 324 S.C. 249, 478 S.E.2d 841 (1996).
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Governor of South Carolina can hold office is indeed difficult." 9 By relying on the
public importance rule, the court's liberal treatment of standing in Sanford raises
significant constitutional concerns that the South Carolina judiciary may be acting
in excess of its authority to reach the merits of a case challenging the ability of the
state's chief executive officer to hold office. The court alluded to the constitutional
problem in its opinion: "a private person may not invoke the judicial power to
determine the validity of executive or legislative action unless he has sustained, or
is in immediate danger, of sustaining prejudice therefrom."' 2 ° Arguably, those
harmed by legislative or executive actions, instead of by court action, ought to seek
redress from the political process. Nonetheless, the idealistic hope that elections
protect citizens from their government does not hold true in all instances. As a
practical matter, an isolated wrong committed by the state upon an insular minority
likely will not elicit the passions of the electorate.
Interestingly, the court addressed the evolution of its standing jurisprudence,
conceding that a claim very similar to Sloan's did not survive that standing test.'
The court then discussed the necessity to strike "[a]n appropriate balance between
the competing policy concerns underlying the issue of standing...." 2 2 The court
stressed a need for balance, but then failed to apply this balancing standard to the
facts of Sanford. The court never directly said the merits of Sloan's claim
outweighed the interests of judicial economy; rather, the court utilized its public
importance rule to find Sloan's claim rose to such a level of public import as to
justify standing."2
Despite the strength of arguments based on separation of powers and the proper
judicial role, the standing issue in Sanford was rightly decided on whole. Though

119. See id.
120. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Blandon v. Coleman, 285 S.C. 472, 330 S.E.2d 298 (1985)).
121. See id. (describing Culbertson v. Blatt, 194 S.C. 105, 9 S.E.2d 218 (1940), decided sixty-four

years earlier, which denied standing to plaintiffs seeking to bring suit "against several dual officeholding public officials"; the court then discussed the liberalization of the court's standing
requirements).
122. Id. The court described this balance as follows:

Citizens must be afforded access to the judicial process to address alleged
injustices. On the other hand, standing cannot be granted to every individual who
has a grievance against a public official. Otherwise, public officials would be
subject to numerous lawsuits at the expense of both judicial economy and the

freedom from frivolous lawsuits.
Sloan v. Sanford, 357 S.C. 431, 434, 543 S.E.2d 470, 472 (2004).

123. The court described its holding as consistent with prior holdings:
We conclude Petitioner has public interest standing because of the importance of
the issue he raises.. Our conclusion is consistent with prior case law. In Baird,
supra, doctors sued Charleston County to enjoin the issuance of tax-exempt bonds
to the Medical University of South Carolina (MUSC) for its purchase of St.
Francis Hospital. We held the issuance of the hospital bonds clearly impacts a

profound public interest, the public health and welfare. The eligibility of South
Carolina's governor to serve in this State's highest elected office is at least as
important as the proper funding for a clinical hospital for MUSC. Accordingly,

we confer standing.
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the holding lacked some doctrinal analysis, particularly in answering why Sloan's
interest outweighed the government's interest, the holding was consistent with the
South Carolina standing model. Consistency alone is not a sufficient reason for the
court's decision. The underlying rationale, however, is sufficient. Because it is
difficult to imagine how, in light of South Carolina's standing model, the court in
Sanfordcould not have granted standing. The court's standingjurisprudence favors
the state's taxpayers, and as will further be explored, South Carolina courts'
willingness to listen to South Carolina's taxpayers is only proper in light of the
government's role as servant of the people.
IV.

FEDERAL VERSUS'SOUTH CAROLINA STANDING ANALYSIS

The South Carolina and federal standing models each are based on a
completely separate constitution, statutory scheme, and case law. Thus, differences
in the adjudication of cases involving standing issues is reasonable. While South
Carolina courts do not strictly adhere to the federal standing model, they have cited
federal case law in their standing decisions and have purported to adopt rules from
those cases. South Carolina courts have cited to the federal standing model, when
they have a reason to do so. For example, the South Carolina Supreme Court likely
adopted Lujan in Sea Pines because the facts and issues before the court were
similar to those in Lujan. 4 Thus, the federal precedent spoke to the particular facts
in Sea Pines, although the standard was not entirely consistent with South
Carolina's preexisting standing model.
Excepting the supreme court's adoption of Lujan, South Carolina has set its
own standard for deciding who should have access to the court. South Carolina
courts can accommodate a more liberal standard than federal courts because of the
parochial nature of state law. Both geographically and in population terms, South
Carolina is a small state. As long as South Carolina's residents do not suddenly
bombard the court system with taxpayer claims, the courts of this state can continue
reaching the merits of taxpayer claims with little hesitation.
Although appropriate in South Carolina courts, a liberal taxpayer standing
model would be impracticable for federal courts' use.
Notwithstanding
constitutional differences, the federal courts likely could not manage the volume
of potential claims. As the size of the federal government has grown since its
founding, so has the number of potential taxpayer claimants.
South Carolina state courts do not face the same concerns that lead the federal
courts to restrict standing grants. Although most South Carolinians probably do not
think about separation of powers with respect to state government, the issue often
arises in debates over the actions of the federal government.
Particularly, conservatives decry what they see as a judiciary full of activist
judges usurping executive and legislative power. Though Governor Sanford has
often addressed separation of powers in South Carolina's government and
constitution, the issue does not elicit the electorate's constant attention. The United

124. See supra Part I.A.2.
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States Supreme Court's strict standing requirements are based on the Court's
deference for separation of powers. On the other hand, South Carolina case law
demonstrates less concern over such issues."z The courts are not abdicating their
duty or usurping power. Rather, South Carolina courts recognize injustice where
the government treads upon the rights of certain South Carolina citizens and leaves
them without recourse. The limited size and scope of the state government should
quell many concerns about judicial overreaching. The states of modem America
exist with the assurance that the United States Supreme Court can check the judicial
decisions of their highest state courts involving a federal or United States
constitutional issue.' 6 The federal government has no such oversight looming, thus
concerns over separation of powers must be a key concern of the United States
Supreme Court. Allowing suits by taxpayers against a state government serves the
ideal that a government is by, for, and of the people and that logically those citizens
should be able to hold that government accountable through the electoral process
and through the courts.
On the whole, the South Carolina model is an approach well suited for our
state. As enumerated above, South Carolina's standing model allows for
adjudication of claims that otherwise might not be heard. The model allows South
Carolinians to hold the state accountable for its actions. Despite the apparent
conflict between the federal and South Carolina models, each is suited to a
legitimate and practical purpose within its realm.
VI. CONCLUSION

Sloan v. Sanford highlights the importance of the ability to be heard in state
court. The case presented a unique opportunity to look beyond the headlines to
substance, and from there to contrast the differences between a more receptive
South Carolina taxpayer standing model with a more restrictive federal model.
Though the federal and South Carolina models are based upon different systems,
and each is logical in its own right, South Carolina affords a taxpayer claimant the
respect due the people who pay the bills.
Joshua D. Spencer

125. See supra Part III.D.
126. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1994).
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